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HOW SUFFICIENT IS THE "SUFFICIENT
CONNECTION TEST" IN GRANTING
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
TO NONRESIDENT ALIENS?: UNITED
STATES v. VERDUGO- URQUIDEZ
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures."' It was not until 123 years after the amendment's adop-
tion, however, that the United States Supreme Court, in Weeks v.
United States,2 promulgated what has come to be known as the
exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment.3 Under this rule, evi-
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment, adopted in 1791, states in full:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
2 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
See id. at 398. In Weeks, the Court held that prejudicial error would be committed by
allowing evidence seized unreasonably and without a warrant to be used against a criminal
defendant. Id. Writing for the Court, Justice Day stated that the evidence seized by federal
officials in violation of the fourth amendment could not be used at trial, but noted that this
rule, later termed the "exclusionary rule", did not apply to evidence seized by state officials.
Id.; see Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71, 76 (1855) (holding fourth amendment restrictions
applicable to federal government only).
In 1927, in two separate cases, the Supreme Court expanded the exclusionary rule to
include searches conducted by state officials acting with either a federal purpose or federal
participation. See Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 317 (1927) (fourth amendment
applicable to state searches with federal purpose); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33
(1927) (fourth amendment applicable to joint searches by federal and local officials). The
principles established in these cases formed what came to be known as the "silver platter"
doctrine, under which it would be determined whether federal officials had sufficient in-
volvement in state searches as the basis of a federal proceeding allowing the defendant ex-
clusionary rule protections. See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949) ("not a
search by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the
federal authorities on a silver platter"); see also Note, The International Silver Platter and
the "Shocks the Conscience" Test: U.S. Law Enforcement Overseas, 67 WAsH. U.L.Q. 489,
493 (1989) (discussing evolution of "silver platter" doctrine).
With the adoption of the fourteenth amendment forbidding the states to "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," many constitutional provi-
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dence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissi-
ble in criminal proceedings. 4 Since its inception in Weeks, the ex-
sions became applicable to state as well as federal action. See W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRM-
INAL PROCEDURE § 3.1, at 78-79 (1985) [hereinafter LAFAvE]. In the years following its enact-
ment, most of the guarantees of the first eight amendments were incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment and thus became binding upon the states. Id. While holding that the
fourth amendment applied to state actions, the Supreme Court concluded that the judicially
created exclusionary rule, not explicitly provided for within the language of the fourth
amendment, did not apply to state proceedings. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-33 (1949),
overruled by, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Shortly after the Wolf decision, the Court
qualified its holding by stating that the fourteenth amendment precludes the introduction
of evidence in state proceedings that was obtained using "conduct that shocks the con-
science." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), overruled by, Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
The exclusionary rule was given even broader application when the Court chose to elim-
inate the "silver platter" doctrine from federal criminal trials. See Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960) ("evidence obtained by state officers during a search which, if
conducted by federal officers, would have violated the defendant's immunity from unreason-
able searches and seizures under the fourth amendment is inadmissible over defendant's
timely objection in a federal criminal trial"). In Elkins, the Court reasoned that the "silver
platter" doctrine would discourage cooperation between state and federal officials and vio-
late judicial integrity. Id. at 221-23. Shortly after the Elkins decision the Court finally made
the exclusionary rule fully applicable to the states. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-60
(1961). In Mapp, the Court overruled Wolf, reasoning that to permit states, in state pro-
ceedings, to use unlawfully seized evidence would encourage disobedience to the Constitu-
tion which the states themselves were bound to uphold. Id. at 657.
' See supra note 3 and accompanying text (outlining development of exclusionary rule).
Under the Constitution, for a valid search to take place, probable cause must exist. U.S.
CONsT. amend. IV. This standard must be satisfied for searches with or without a warrant.
See LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 3.31, at 110. However, the Supreme Court has recognized that
in situations where the existence of probable cause is brought into question, the presence of
a warrant may tip the scales in favor of concluding that probable cause exists. See United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) ("resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in
this area [probable cause] should be largely determined by the preference accorded to war-
rants"). This conclusion merely reflects the general principle that a warrant will be required
in searches of private places absent extenuating circumstances. See Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1980) ("long-settled premise that, absent exigent circumstances, a
warrantless entry to search" a private home is unconstitutional). The presence of a warrant
is preferred mainly because it allows a search to take place only when its reasonableness has
been determined by an impartial magistrate. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51
(1951) (fourth amendment "interposes an orderly procedure under the aegis of judicial im-
partiality that is necessary to attain the beneficent purpose intended").
The exclusionary rule was developed in an attempt to ensure that fourth amendment
guarantees were enforced. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (exclusionary rule is "clear, specific,
and constitutionally required-even if judicially implied-deterrent safeguard"). However,
there have been several theories as to how this goal is best accomplished. See LAFAvE, supra
note 3, § 3.1, at 81-84. It has been suggested that the exclusionary rule serves as a deterrent
to illegal police conduct, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965); that it prevents
the judiciary from becoming accomplices to illegal police action, see Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223;
that it prevents the government from benefitting from its own unlawful conduct, see Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); and, that it prevents searches from being conducted solely
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clusionary rule has been applied to United States citizens
regardless of whether they reside within the country5 or abroad.6
at the discretion of police officers, see Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
However, the exclusionary rule has not been universally supported. See generally
LAFAvE supra note 3, § 3.1, at 81-84 (examining arguments against exclusionary rule). Chief
Justice Burger, dissenting in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), expressed dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule. Id. at
415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In declaring the exclusionary rule "both conceptually sterile
and practically ineffective," Chief Justice Burger suggested that the rule did little to deter
unlawful police conduct. Id. at 416 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He further argued that the
exclusionary rule hinders the prosecution's effort to build a case. Id. at 417 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Chief Justice Burger reasoned that any theory that assumes police misconduct
would be deterred under the exclusionary rule assumes incorrectly that law enforcement is a
"monolithic governmental enterprise." Id. at 416-17 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In reaction to arguments such as Chief Justice Burger's, the Court chose to create a
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
922-24 (1984). In Leon, the Court decided that the exclusionary rule was flexible enough to
allow law enforcement officials to rely on a warrant issued by a neutral detached magistrate
even though the warrant ultimately was found to be lacking in probable cause. See id. at
922. The Court, however, was unwilling to create a sweeping "good faith" exception applica-
ble in all situations in which a warrant is present. Id. at 922-23. The Court stated that a
police officer's "reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause determination and on the tech-
nical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable." Id. at 922. In fact,
the Court identified three situations in which reliance would not be objectively reasonable,
rendering the good faith exception inapplicable. Id. at 923. First, this exception would not
allow reliance on a magistrate's finding of probable cause if that finding was based on an
affidavit of known falsity, or upon which its determination of truth was recklessly based. Id.
Second, the exception would not apply where the magistrate has "wholly abandoned hisjudicial role," merely acting as a "rubber stamp" for the police when issuing warrants. Id.
Finally, the "good faith" exception will not permit an officer to rely on a warrant based on
an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probability as to render reliance upon it unreasonable.
Id.
, See, e.g., Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (extending exclusionary rule protections to citizens in
state proceedings); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 387, 398 (creating exclusionary rule to deter unrea-
sonable searches and seizures against citizens performed by federal agents in disregard of
fourth amendment). See generally Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Constitu-
tion-Unalienable Rights?, 72 VA. L. REv. 649, 660-61 (1986) (discussing constitutional
rights of United States citizens within United States).
I See, e.g., United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1264 (5th Cir.) (fourth amendment
rights guaranteed to United States citizens residing abroad), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831
(1979). The Constitution has not always been interpreted so broadly. Earlier in its history,
the Supreme Court was not willing to apply constitutional protections extraterritorialy. See
Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). In Ross, the Court held that the Constitution
had no application in foreign countries and that the authority of the United States govern-
ment could be exercised only to the extent that both countries agreed. Id. The Court later
renounced its decision in Ross, stating that "[w]hen the Government reaches out to punish a
citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution
provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens
to be in another land." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (plurality opinion). Although
Reid was merely a plurality opinion, its principles generally have been accepted. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW § 721 comment b (1986). Comment b states
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Aliens residing within the United States, whether legally and ille-
gally, have received a significant number of constitutional protec-
tions.7 The nature of the fourth amendment protections afforded
these aliens, however, remained largely unsettled8 until the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez.9 In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court held that nonresident
aliens are not entitled to the protections of the exclusionary rule
absent a "sufficient connection" between the nonresident alien and
the United States. 10
This Note will explore the exclusionary rule as it applies to
United States citizens while living abroad as well as to aliens, re-
siding both within and outside the United States. Part One will
trace the historical development of the exclusionary rule. Part Two
will review the Verdugo-Urquidez decision and explore the poten-
tial ramifications of applying a "sufficient connection" standard to
noncitizens residing abroad. Finally, Part Three will outline the
various factors which should be considered in determining whether
a noncitizen is entitled to fourth amendment protections under the
"sufficient connection" test articulated in Verdugo-Urquidez.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. Constitutional Protections Afforded United States Citizens
Abroad
For a substantial period of time, the Supreme Court, failing to
distinguish between aliens and citizens, refused to extend the pro-
tections of the United States Constitution beyond the boundaries
in pertinent part: "The Constitution governs the exercise of authority by the United States
government over United States citizens outside United States territory, for example on the
high seas, and even on foreign soil." Id.
" See infra note 18 and accompanying text (discussion of constitutional protections af-
forded aliens).
8 See infra note 19-27 and accompanying text (discussing development of Court's views
concerning constitutional rights of aliens within the United States).
9 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
10 Id. at 1064. This decision ended speculation that the fourth amendment would apply
extraterritorially to nonresident aliens. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 6. The Restate-
ment states in pertinent part: "Although the matter has not been definitely adjudicated, the
Constitution probably governs also at least some exercises of authority by the United States
in respect of some aliens abroad." Id. However, the Verdugo-Urquidez Court emphasized
that as of yet, no determination had been made as to whether resident aliens would receive
fourth amendment protections. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064-65.
[Vol. 64:629
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of the United States." In fact, the Court did not expressly repudi-
ate this stance with respect to United States citizens until its 1957
decision in Reid v. Covert.12 In Reid, a consolidation of two cases,
each defendant was charged with murdering her husband in a for-
eign country. 3 Although both women were United States citizens,
each was tried and convicted in a non-jury court martial proceed-
ing because of her status as the wife of a military officer.1 4 A plu-
rality of the Court determined that a United States citizen, even
while abroad, was entitled under the United States Constitution to
a trial by jury.15 The Court reasoned that an individual should not
forfeit her constitutional rights merely because she is in a foreign
land. 6 Although only a plurality opinion, Reid generally is re-
garded as precedent for granting constitutional protections to
United States citizens traveling or residing outside the country. 7
B. Constitutional Protections Afforded Aliens Within the
United States
Despite its reluctance to apply the Constitution extraterritori-
ally, the Supreme Court has been more liberal in granting constitu-
tional protections to aliens residing within the United States. 8 As
" See Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (citing Cook v. United States, 138
U.S. 157, 181 (1891)). In Ross, the Supreme Court refused to grant constitutional protec-
tions to a defendant who had committed a murder on an American ship within a Japanese
harbor. Id. at 454. Ross was convicted by an American consular tribunal and claimed that
his sixth amendment right to trial by jury and his fifth amendment right to be indicted by a
grand jury had been violated. Id. at 458. In reaching its decision, the Court concluded that
the Constitution applied only within the United States and, thus, had no force abroad. Id.
at 464.
12 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
,' Id. at 3-4.
14 Id.
'5 Id. at 18-19. After granting the petitioners a rehearing, the Court vacated its previous
decision denying the petitioners a jury trial and recognized a defendant's right under article
III and the fifth and sixth amendments of the Constitution to a jury trial, even in an action
outside the United States. Id. at 5.
"8 Id. at 6. The Court refused to adhere to previous decisions which granted the protec-
tion to only those rights deemed "fundamental." Id. at 9. Specifically, the Court repudiated
its decision in Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453 (1891). Reid, 354 U.S. at 10. The Reid court
criticized the holding in Ross as resting on a "fundamental misconception" and character-
ized as an historic accident consular jurisdiction's antedating of the Constitution. Id. at 12.
1" See supra note 6 (discussing Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law and its
incorporation of Reid decision).
18 See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51 (1950) (procedural due
process requirement applies to deportable aliens); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228, 238 (1896) (same fifth and sixth amendment protections guaranteed to deportable
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early as 1886, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,19 the Court recognized that
the fourteenth amendment's protection extended to all "persons"
within the United States, and not merely United States citizens.2 0
In Mathews v. Diaz,21 however, the Court suggested that the enti-
tlement of all "persons" to due process protection22 does not neces-
sarily mean that each alien may enjoy every advantage of citizen-
ship.23 The Court recognized the validity of many constitutional
and statutory provisions distinguishing between aliens and
citizens.24
Notwithstanding the Mathews decision, in I.N.S. v. Lopez-
aliens as to other accused). But see, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77-78 (1976) (fifth
and fourteenth amendment protections apply to all aliens, but do not guarantee all advan-
tages of citizenship). See generally Note, Aliens' Fourth Amendment Rights Against Gov-
ernment Searches Abroad-United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989), 64 WASH. L. REV. 701, 703-04 (1989) (discussing
protection of aliens from government actions within United States).
19 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
20 Id. at 369. In 1982, the Court expressly stated that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment applied to illegal aliens within the United States. See Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982). In I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (plurality opin-
ion), the Court held that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule did not apply to deporta-
tion hearings, which were "purely" civil actions, but suggested that it would apply to the
arrest of an undocumented alien. Id. at 1050. But see Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064-
65. In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court stated that its Lopez-Mendoza decision had not ex-
pressly examined the question of whether undocumented aliens were protected by the
fourth amendment and cautioned against reliance on that proposition. Id.; cf. Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (recognizing that alien seeking admission to United States
has no constitutional rights regarding his application); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977) (same); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (same).
21 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
22 Id. at 78. In Mathews, the application for enrollment in the Medicare supplemental
medical insurance program by several resident aliens was denied on the ground that they
had not established five years of residency within the United States, as required by statute.
Id. at 70. The Court held that such a requirement did not deprive appellees of their fifth
amendment guarantees of due process. Id. at 87.
" Id. at 82-83. In reaching its decision, the Court declared that Congress had no consti-
tutional duty to provide all aliens with welfare benefits and could discriminate within the
class of aliens. Id. at 80. Additionally, the Court held that aliens did not constitute "a single
homogeneous legal classification" and were not entitled to all the advantages of United
States citizenship. Id. at 78.
", See id. at 78-79 n.12. The Court noted that Congress, acting within the broad scope
of its powers over naturalization and immigration, can pass legislation adversly affecting
aliens that would be "unacceptable" if intended for citizens. Id. at 80. For example, congres-
sional authority to exclude and to deport aliens has no counterpart with respect to citizens.
Id. Accordingly, the Mathews Court found that the true issue did not concern discrimina-
tion between aliens and citizens, but statutory discrimination "within the class of aliens,"
which would provide benefits to some aliens and withhold them from others. Id.
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Mendoza,25 the Court suggested that illegal aliens fall within the
broad classification of the term "the people" 26 and, therefore, pos-
sessed the same fourth amendment rights as did citizens and legal
aliens.17 In Verdugo-Urquidez, however, the Court downplayed the
significance of its statements in Lopez-Mendoza by characterizing
them as merely incidental to its decision.28
II. THE Verdugo-Urquidez DECISION
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the defendant, a Mexican citizen, was
apprehended by Mexican police, who transported him to Califor-
nia, where United States Marshals arrested him on narcotics
charges. 29 Following Verdugo-Urquidez's arrest, agents of the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), operat-
ing in conjunction with the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, con-
ducted a warrantless search of the defendant's Mexican resi-
dences.30 The search uncovered a tally sheet, indicating the
quantities of marijuana allegedly smuggled by the defendant into
the United States, which government prosecuters hoped to intro-
duce as evidence.3 1 In a pretrial motion, Verdugo-Urquidez argued
against the admissibility of the evidence, claiming that the search
violated his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches.32 The district court agreed and, accordingly, suppressed
22 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
28 See U.S. CONST. amends. I, II, IV, IX, & X; infra note 39 (discussion of term "the
people").
27 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050.
28 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064-65; see also supra note 20 (discussing Lo-
pez-Mendoza as limited by Verdugo-Urquidez court). According to the dissent, however,
the majority in Verdugo-Urquidez failed to recognize that many lower federal court deci-
sions granted fourth amendment protection to illegal aliens within the United States and
that no lower court has held otherwise: Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1070 n.6 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); see Benitez-Mendez v. I.N.S., 760 F.2d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 1983) (detention of
alien worker in Border Patrol vehicle was "seizure"); Au Yi Lau v. I.N.S., 445 F.2d 217, 223
(D.D.C.) (aliens as well as citizens in United States "sheltered" by fourth amendment), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
19 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059. The United States Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration ("DEA") believed the defendant to be a leader of "a large and violent organization
in Mexico" responsible for smuggling narcotics into the United States. Id. After obtaining a
warrant for his arrest in August, 1985, United States Marshals arranged with the Mexican
police for the apprehension of Verdugo-Urquidez. Id.
30 Id. The DEA believed the search would uncover evidence of the defendant's alleged
narcotics trafficking and his involvement in the kidnapping and torture-murder of a DEA
agent. Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. Verdugo-Urquidez claimed that the search, although conducted in Mexico, was
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the evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule.3 3 The affirmation
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 4 was reversed by the Su-
preme Court, which found that the defendant was not protected by
the fourth amendment.3 5
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist reviewed the
history of the fourth amendment and determined that it was not
meant to "restrain the actions of the Federal Government against
aliens outside of the United States territory." 6 Chief Justice
Rehnquist further reasoned that while the fourth amendment pro-
subject to the warrant requirements of the fourth amendment, and, because no search war-
rant had been obtained, he asserted that his constitutional rights had been violated. Id.
33 Id.
3, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct.
1056 (1990).
See Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1066.
36 Id. at 1061. The majority noted that, originally, the Framers purposely excluded a
provision restricting searches and seizures because they believed that the federal govern-
ment had no authority to conduct such activities. Id. (citing C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 508-09 (1928); THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter
ed. 1961); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (J. Gales ed.1789) (statement of J. Madison)). Ultimately,
an amendment restricting unreasonable searches and seizures was deemed necessary to pro-
tect the people of the United States from arbitrary governmental action, but, in the major-
ity's view, it was never intended to apply to searches outside of the territory of the United
States. Id. To illustrate his point further, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to the searches
of French vessels during the "undeclared war" between France and the United States that
occurred seven years after the fourth amendment was ratified. Id. at 1061-62. During that
time, Congress authorized President Adams to "instruct commanders of the public armed
vessels ... to subdue, seize and take any armed French vessel... found within the jurisdic-
tional limits of the United States or elsewhere, on the high seas." Id. at 1062 (quoting AN
ACT FURTHER TO PROTECT THE COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ch. 68, § 1, 1 Stat. 578). In
addition, Congress authorized the President to commission private ship owners to do the
same. Id. Despite some violations of this grant of authority, the majority asserted that a
fourth amendment restraint on the government's power to conduct such activities was never
questioned. Id. Therefore, the Court concluded that the fourth amendment was not meant
to have a global application. Id.
The Court further stated that the Ninth Circuit's position was contrary to its holdings
in the Insular Cases-that governmental action is not necessarily subject to each constitu-
tional provision, even in territories where the United States has sovereign power. Id.; see,
e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 302 (1922) (sixth amendment guarantee to jury trial
inapplicable in Puerto Rico territory not incorporated into United States); Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (fifth amendment grand jury guarantee inapplicable in
Philippines). The majority reasoned that if these rights were denied to persons in territories
governed by the United States, then the argument to extend the fourth amendment to
aliens in another country becomes even weaker. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1062. But
see id. at 1074 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan would limit the holding in the
Insular Cases, arguing that they focus on criminal prosecutions brought by territorial au-
thorities in territorial courts. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Brennan
cited Reid as limiting these cases to their facts. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tects "the people" of the United States,3 7 its guarantees reach a
smaller class of persons than do those of the fifth amendment,
which, by its terms, applies to any "person.""8 Therefore, the Chief
Justice reasoned, the Court was justified in granting aliens fifth
amendment protections while denying them the guarantees of the
fourth amendment.39 Distinguishing the Court's holdings in Reid
and cases dealing with resident aliens, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that without some "sufficient connection" to the United
States, the fourth amendment would not be applicable to nonresi-
dent aliens.40
37 See supra note 1 (text of fourth amendment).
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that the defendant should be denied
the protections of the warrant clause of the fourth. amendment because the search was con-
ducted outside the United States. Id. at 1067-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Stevens,
in a separate concurrence, stated that the warrant clause of the fourth amendment is not
applicable to noncitizens in foreign lands because American authorities have "no power to
authorize such searches." Id. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring). However, he did argue that
although Verdugo-Urquidez had been brought to the United States against his will, he was
lawfully there and thus was one of the "people" entitled to the protections of the reasona-
bleness standard of the fourth amendment. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens was
satisfied that the reasonableness standard was met in this case. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
38 U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The fifth amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
Id. (emphasis added).
9 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060-61. The Court asserted that the term "the
people," as found in the preamble; article I, section 2, clause 1; and the first, second, fourth,
ninth and tenth amendments, refers to members of a national community, or those with a
"sufficient connection" to the United States. Id. The purposefulness of the Framers in their
use of "the people" is underscored by the terms "person" and "accused" in the fifth and
sixth amendments, which control criminal procedure. Id. at 1060. In distinguishing the
fourth and fifth amendments, the Court recognized that a criminal defendant's fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination is a "fundamental trial right" that cannot be vio-
lated until the time of trial. Id. Any violation of the fourth amendment, however, would be
fully accomplished at the time of the intrusion and therefore completed well before the time
of the trial. Id. (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974); United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)).
10 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1063. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the
Reid decision did not stand for the broad holding that all United States citizens abroad
were entitled to all constitutional protections. Id. He further stated that the Reid holding
stands for the proposition that a citizen of the United States "stationed abroad could invoke
the protection of the fifth and sixth amendments." Id. Based on this logic, the Court con-
cluded that the defendant could not benefit from the Reid decision. Id. The Court also
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As the chief dissenter, 41 Justice Brennan wrote that the major-
ity's decision had created an "antilogy" by allowing the govern-
ment to enforce the Constitution abroad without being subject to
its express limitations.42 Justice Brennan argued that when the
government attempts to hold a nonresident alien accountable
under United States law, that alien in fact becomes one of the gov-
erned, one of "the people" protected by the fourth amendment,
even under the majority's "sufficient connection" standard.43 Jus-
refused to allow Verdugo-Urquidez the benefit of its decisions granting constitutional pro-
tections to aliens within the United States. Id. at 1064; see supra note 18 (discussing rights
granted to resident aliens). In this instance, the Court indicated that its "sufficient connec-
tion" standard may be satisfied only if the alien has some "substantial connection" to the
United States. See Verdugo-Uriquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064 (emphasis added). The majority
felt that because Verdugo-Urquidez had not voluntarily associated himself with the United
States, he could not avail himself of the previous Court decisions involving aliens in this
country who had voluntarily associated themselves with the United States. Id. In reaching
this conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist was careful to limit the Court's holding in I.N.S. v
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064-65. In Lopez-
Mendoza, the Court inferred that illegal aliens residing within the United States were enti-
tled to fourth amendment protections. See supra note 20 (discussing the Lopez-Mendoza
decision).
41 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In a separate dissent,
Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Stevens' concurring opinion that the warrant clause
of the fourth amendment did not apply in this case. Id. at 1078. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
However, Justice Blackmun argued that the search must still be reasonable based on proba-
ble cause. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The issue of reasonableness was not determined in
the lower courts, and therefore, he suggested that the case be remanded for further proceed-
ings. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 1069-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Recently, the United States government has
successfully held foreign nationals criminally liable for violations occurring entirely beyond
the territorial limits of the United States. Id. at 1068-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan argued that by failing to recognize the fourth amendment rights of these individu-
als, while holding them to the same standard of conduct, the majority disregarded the basic
principles of mutuality. Id. at 1071 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see infra note 44 (discussing
mutuality).
43 Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1070-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
noted that the majority recognized the term "the people" as being more inclusive than citi-
zenship of the United States. Id. at 1070 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, he also recog-
nized that the majority gave little guidance as to what persons are included within "the
people," other than noting that the alien must have some substantial connection to the
United States which must be voluntary and coupled with some societal obligation. Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that while the majority recognized the
term "the people" as a term of art, it failed to find conclusively that the term was intended
to be construed more narrowly than the term "person." Id. at 1072 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Brennan, the majority failed to recognize that "the people" is merely a
rhetorical counterpart to the term "the government," thus making the majority's reliance on
the wording unfounded. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan further argued that even if the "sufficient connection" test were ap-
plied in this case, it would be satisfied by the government action and not the actions of
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tice Brennan argued further that if the United States government
expects aliens to obey its laws, then these aliens are entitled to
expect the United States to abide by its Constitution.44 Finally,
Justice Brennan stated that the majority had misinterpreted the
Constitution by inferring that it was intended to create rights,
when in fact it was enacted to prohibit the government from in-
fringing on the natural rights of all people.45
It appears that the Verdugo-Urquidez majority failed to con-
front sufficiently the arguments in favor of granting nonresident
aliens the protections of the fourth amendment and its exclusion-
ary rule. In reaching its decision, the Court seemingly viewed the
Constitution as a compact between the federal government and its
citizens. 46 Such a position ignores the works of scholars who have
Verdugo-Urquidez. Id. at 1070-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan asserted that
underlying this contention is the fact that the accused was investigated, is being prosecuted,
and faces the possibility of spending the rest of his life in a prison within the United States.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 1071. (Brennan, J., dissenting). This principle, known as "mutuality," has been
recognized since the time of the Framers. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Generally speaking,
the denial of this protection would require aliens to follow the laws of the United States
while the government would be able to violate the Constitution at will, thus debilitating the
document upon which all the nation's laws are based. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Accord-
ing to Justice Brennan, "[m]utuality is essential to ensure the fundamental fairness that
underlies our Bill of Rights. Foreign nationals investigated and prosecuted for alleged viola-
tions of United States criminal laws are just as vulnerable to oppressive government behav-
ior as are United States citizens investigated and prosecuted for the same alleged viola-
tions." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Brennan recognized that respecting
the rights of foreigners would encourage other nations to respect the rights of United States
citizens. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4" Id. at 1073 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan wrote:
The focus of the Fourth Amendment is on what the Government can and cannot
do, and how it may act, not on against whom these actions may be taken. Bestow-
ing rights and delineating protected groups would have been inconsistent with the
drafters' fundamental conception of a Bill of Rights as a limitation on the Govern-
ment's conduct with respect to all whom it seeks to govern.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan proposed that the full rights of the fourth amendment, including its
warrant provisions, should be applied even to searches and seizures of nonresident aliens
occurring outside the United States. Id. at 1075-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Bren-
nan contended that, although the warrant technically would not be valid in a foreign coun-
try, mandating one would preserve the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amend-
ment. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4' See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1218-20 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). Although the majority did not address it directly, the court
appears to have sided with advocates of a "compact theory" of the Constitution, as dis-
cussed by the circuit court. Id. Under a "compact theory," the Constitution is deemed to be
a contract between the people of the United States and the government. Id. at 1218. This
theory has found some support in decisions of the Supreme Court. Id. at 1219; see, e.g.,
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asserted that the Constitution is a document recognizing the natu-
ral rights of all individuals, whether or not they are citizens of the
United States.47 While the Court appeared to acknowledge some of
these rights by establishing a "sufficient connection" test that re-
quires a nexus between the defendant and the United States short
of citizenship, it failed to articulate the specific factors to be ap-
plied under this test.48 Furthermore, the Court overlooked the po-
tential ramifications of its decision.49 For example, co-defendants
engaging in the same conduct, could be granted different standards
of constitutional protection if one were a nonresident alien and the
other a United States citizen.5 0 Thus, it becomes necessary to de-
League v. De Young, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 185, 202 (1850) ("Constitution of the United States
was made by, and for the protection of, the people of the United States"); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-05 (1819) (government of the people, by and for the
benefit of the people); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793) (Constitution is
a "compact made by the people of the United States to govern themselves").
The compact theory of government was espoused by one of the great political philoso-
phers, John Locke. See J. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870
44 (1978). Locke theorized that the people of a society would give up part of their natural
independence in exchange for protection, by the government, of their most essential liber-
ties. Id. Based on the majority's reasoning, it appears that the Court accepted this notion
and believed that an individual must surrender some liberties to receive all the benefits the
government has to offer. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1233 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
In this manner, the Court justified its conclusion that "the people" meant people who were
part of a national community, and not just any "person" seeking to benefit from United
States law or constitutional protections. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060-61.
"' See 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 327, at
296-97 (1833). Story asserted that while the Constitution forms a society based on a com-
pact, the document embraces many persons who have not assented to this form of govern-
ment. Id. at 296. For example, infants, minors, or incompetents have never assented to the
Constitution, yet they are subject to its limitations and entitled to its protections. Id. at
296-97. Thus, Story rejected the compact theory, declaring that the full protections of the
Constitution cannot be reconciled with it. Id.; see Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1066-67
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1219-20 (discussing "natural
rights" as opposed to compact theory).
This natural rights theory appears to have greatly influenced the Framers. See B.
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 188 (1967). The Framers,
in the words of Thomas Jefferson, intended for the source of human rights to be recognized
as "the laws of nature, and not the gift of their chief magistrate." Id.
48 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1070 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although the
Court' acknowledged that the term "the people" is broader than "citizenry," it failed to
describe what "sufficient connection" is needed by a nonresident alien to fall within the
term "the people." See id. (Brennan J., dissenting). At one point the Court mentioned that
the alien must have "substantial connections" to the United States. Id. at 1064. At other
points, the Court stated that the alien must be voluntarily present within the United States
and must have accepted some "societal obligation." Id. at 1064-65.
4 See id. at 1071 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5o Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that such an occurrence would
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fine the term "sufficient connection" in a manner that distin-
guishes between citizens and noncitizens, yet treats noncitizens as
equitably as possible.
III. FACTORS TO BE EXAMINED IN "SUFFICIENT CONNECTION"
DETERMINATION
Although the Supreme Court provided little guidance for the
application of its "sufficient connection" standard, it is submitted
that several factors are clearly relevant to the determination of
whether a sufficient nexus exists between a nonresident alien and
the United States to justify granting him fourth amendment pro-
tections. It appears that before a court will offer an alien fourth
amendment protection, there must be some degree of mutual obli-
gation between the alien and the United States government.5 1 The
Court, seemingly, is awarding the alien a degree of constitutional
protection commensurate with the benefit the alien bestows upon
the United States.
Application of a three-step analysis is proposed to determine
whether an alien has fulfilled his portion of this mutual obligation.
Under the first step, a court would examine whether agents of the
United States were in fact chargeable with the actions in ques-
tion.52 In Stonehill v. United States,55 the Ninth Circuit recog-
violate the principles of mutuality. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). He further argued that
when the United States respects the rights of foreign nationals it encourages foreign coun-
tries to respect the rights of United States citizens. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan also noted that, as Justice Brandeis warned in Olmstead v. United States:
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means ... would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine, this Court should resolutely
set its face.
Id. at 1071 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
51 See id. at 1070-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan contended that holding
the noncitizen to the same standards as a citizen, while offering the noncitizen fewer protec-
tions violates this mutuality principle. Id. However, the majority appeared to require an
obligation to the United States on the part of an alien that is similar in some respects to
that of a citizen before the alien will receive constitutional protections as sacred as those of
the fourth amendment. Id. at 1063-64. The Court recognized that the exact constitutional
protections a defendant will receive depends greatly upon what process his circumstances
dictate. Id. Therefore, the alien apparently must have some connection to the United States
before the United States has a reciprocal obligation to the alien. Id. at 1063 (quoting Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
02 See E.C. FiSHER, SEARCH AND SEizuRE 79 (1970). "Constitutional provisions prohibit-
ing unreasonable searches and seizures are intended to protect,the people against action by
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nized that because the fourth amendment and its exclusionary rule
were designed to regulate the conduct of federal officers, it did not
apply to the acts of foreign officials.54 The court noted, however,
that the fourth amendment would apply to foreign raids against
United States citizens "if Federal agents so substantially partici-
pated in the raids so as to convert them into joint ventures be-
tween the United States and the foreign officials."55
Once the first step has been addressed, the court would then
shift its focus to the degree of sanctions the defendant might face
if convicted. The level of constitutional protection the alien re-
ceives should increase proportionately with the degree to which his
personal liberties are at'stake.5' For example, an alien whose al-
leged conduct would subject him to a fine or penalty would receive
fewer constitutional protections than an alien facing possible im-
prisonment. This type of analysis would be analogous to the prac-
tice of allowing certain criminal penalties, such as petty offenses,
to be tried without a jury.57
government, its agents and officials, and neither the Fourth Amendment nor comparable
restraints of the state constitutions have application to acts of private citizens undertaken
on their own initiative .... " Id.; see Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). In
Burdeau, the defendant was suspected of committing fraud against his employer. Id. at 472-
73. As a result, agents of the corporation ransacked his office and found incriminating evi-
dence which they passed on to the government. Id. at 473-74. The Court refused to grant
the defendant the protections of the fourth amendment, stating that it applied only to gov-
ernmental action. Id. at 475.
" 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
1, Id. at 743 (citing Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 986 (1967)).
"' Id. (emphasis added). This "joint venture" test is widely accepted. Id.; see United
States v. Paternina-Vergara, 749 F.2d 993, 998 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217
(1985); United States v. Benedict, 647 F.2d 928, 930-31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1087 (1981); United States v. Heller, 625 F.2d 594, 599-600 (5th Cir. 1980).
"6 Cf. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982). The immigration laws have estab-
lished two proceedings by which aliens can be denied hospitality in the United States. Id.
Deportation hearings are the usual means of proceeding against aliens already within the
United States, while exclusionary hearings are usually used against aliens outside the
United States who are seeking admission. Id. Additional protections are provided for in
deportation hearings, such as seven days advance notice of the charges against the alien and
the convenience of having the hearing take place near the alien's residence in the United
States. Id. at 25-26. Furthermore, if the Immigration and Naturalization Service prevails in
a deportation proceeding, the alien can appeal directly to the court of appeals; in contrast,
an exclusion order may be challenged only by a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 26. Moreover,
the deported alien can, within limits, designate the country of deportation and may be able
to depart voluntarily or seek suspension of deportation. Id. at 26-27. The justification for
this distinction depends upon the signifigance of the nexus between the alien and the
United States. Id. at 29.
67 See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969). The sixth amendment of the
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Should the disputed search and seizure be committed by the
United States government in an instance where the nonresident
defendant faces substantial sanctions, the court should consider
still another factor prior to cloaking the defendant with fourth
amendment protections. The final prong of this three-step test
provides the alien with an ascending degree of constitutional pro-
tection in accordance with the beneficial contributions he has be-
stowed upon the United States.58 The court would determine
whether the alien's connections to the United States are suffi-
ciently substantial to establish what, in effect, would be a contract
between the alien and the United States under which he would
receive a degree of fourth amendment protection in proportion to
his level of involvement with the United States.5 9 While some pro-
tections, such as those provided by the fifth and sixth amend-
ments, would be given to an alien who merely has participated in
the justice system of the United States,"° fourth amendment pro-
Constitution gives defendants the right to trial by jury in "all criminal prosecutions." Id. at
148; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Petty offenses, however, may be tried without a jury.
Frank, 395 U.S. at 148. Thus, in instances where the potential sanctions are less severe, a
jury trial is not guaranteed. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). Based on this
logic, the Supreme Court has stated that there are "no constitutional doubts about the prac-
tices, common in both federal and state courts, of accepting waivers of jury trial and prose-
cuting petty crimes without extending a right to jury trial." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 158 (1968).
G" Cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950). In Eisentrager, the Supreme
Court recognized that "[t]he alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospi-
table, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity
with our society." Id. The Court has recognized that in reviewing rights afforded to aliens by
immigration legislation, judicial inquiry is limited. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977). In Fiallo, the Court recognized that Congress has its greatest power when legislating
to exclude aliens from the country. Id. The Supreme Court, however, in Landon v.
Plasencia, stated that "once an alien gains admission to [the United States] and begins to
develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accord-
ingly." Landon, 459 U.S. at 32-33.
" See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1237 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wal-
lace, J., dissenting), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). Dissenting in the lower court opinion,
Judge Wallace stated that the alien defendant's obligation to adhere to the United States
drug laws did not impose a burden sufficient to entitle him to receive the full constitutional
protections given resident aliens. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting). In making this determination,
Judge Wallace stressed that the defendant had neither undertaken to support the United
States government nor placed himself in a position where he might be called upon to serve
for the national defense. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting). This type of reasoning would appear
to support the interpretation of the Constitution as a compact under which the individual
receives a number of liberties reciprocal to the liberties he gives up to the government. See
supra note 46 (discussing "compact theory" of Constitution).
60 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1237 (Wallace, J., dissenting). Judge Wallace de-
clared that although he would not offer the defendant the protections of the fourth amend-
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tections would not be offered as freely."'
To determine whether nonresident aliens are entitled to
fourth amendment protections under the third prong of the test,
four criteria must be applied. First, does the alien currently main-
tain a place of residence within the United States? 2 Second, does
the alien own property within the United States?63 Third, does the
alien generate legal income upon which he pays federal and state
income tax? 4 Fourth, has the alien ever resided within the United
States, and if so, how long has he been absent from the country
and does he intend to return?6 5
ment, the defendant, even as a nonresident alien, would be cloaked with fifth and sixth
amendment rights during trial. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
" See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (discussing reluctance to freely grant
fourth amendment protections).
" Cf. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 968 (11th Cir. 1984), af'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). In
Nelson, the court stated that when considering the rights to be granted aliens who are sub-
ject to deportation, various factors are influential. Id. These factors include a determination
as to whether the alien has ever been naturalized, acquired any domicile within the United
States, or been admitted into the country pursuant to law. Id. (quoting Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892)). In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), the
Court emphasized that an alien gaining admission to the United States receives constitu-
tional protections in accordance with the ties he develops that go with permanent residence.
Id. at 770. It appears that this would include obtaining a domicile within the United States
and perhaps residing within the country for a period of time.
63 Cf. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1. The fifth amendment states in pertinent part:
"No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
..... " U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). The fourteenth amendment states in perti-
nent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (em-
phasis added). By including property with life and liberty, the Framers recognized the sig-
nificance of property ownership, thus making property ownership a "substantial connection"
to the United States. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064 (recognizing need for "sub-
stantial connection"). Furthermore, property ownership would signify a "significant volun-
tary connection" which the Verdugo-Urquidez Court indicated would be necessary under
the "sufficient connection" test. Id.
" Cf. New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 492 (1906). "Generally speaking, a tax is a
pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property for the purpose of supporting the Gov-
ernment." Id. (emphasis added); see Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146 (1938). "Taxation is
neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract. It is
but a way of apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure are
privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens." Id. (emphasis added). It is
suggested that these cases imply that payment of taxes serves as a primary indicator of
whether an individual is entitled to certain benefits from the United States government.
65 Cf. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 458-62 (1963). In Fleuti, the Court noted that
under immigration law, an alien entering the country is treated differently than an alien
already residing within the country for purposes of removal from the United States. Id. at
462. Only "entering" aliens will be subject to exclusionary proceedings, while aliens residing
within the country may only be subject to deportation proceedings. See Landon v.
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Application of the proposed test can best be illustrated by a
series of hypotheticals involving a nonresident alien who, as the
result of an illegal search of his foreign residence, seeks the protec-
tions of the fourth amendment.
Hypothetical A: Insufficient Connection for Fourth Amendment
Protections
Mr. X, the defendant, is a European citizen and a known ter-
rorist. Mr. X is accused of the torture-murder of an American
tourist which he allegedly committed to draw attention to his
group's opposition to United States foreign policy. He has been ar-
rested and is being detained in a federal prison in New York. Fol-
lowing his arrest, United States officials, acting on their own and
without a warrant, broke into his European residence and discov-
ered the alleged murder weapon as well as the victim's blood-
stained clothing. Federal prosecutors now seek to use this evidence
at trial.
Mr. X claims the search was improper due to the absence of a
warrant and seeks to have the evidence suppressed. Other than his
presence in New York as a result of his detention, Mr. X has few
ties to the United States at this time. A small number of Mr. X's
relatives immigrated to the United States several decades ago and
still reside here. In addition, Mr. X resided within the United
States for a good part of his childhood and attended college here;
however, he has not been within the United States for the past
fifteen years.
Analysis:
Step 1: The search was conducted solely by United States offi-
cials and, therefore, the "joint venture" standard articulated in
Stonehill need not be applied.6
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 28 (1982); supra note 56 (discussing differences between deportation
and exclusionary hearings). In determining whether an alien residing within the United
States was making an "entry" upon his return, the alien's intent is crucial. See Fleuti, 374
U.S. at 462. A mere casual, brief excursion by a resident alien will not result in his return
being deemed an "entry." Id. Where, however "the purpose of leaving the country is to
accomplish some object which is itself contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration
laws, it would appear that the interruption of residence ... would properly be regarded as
meaningful." Id.
"' See Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 743. "Neither the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution nor the exclusionary rule of evidence, designed to deter Federal officers
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Step 2: The defendant is charged with murder in the second
degree, a serious offense for which he could be imprisoned for up
to twenty-five years or life. Because the defendant faces a substan-
tial sanction, the court would move to step three of the analysis.
Step 3: While the defendant has no present contacts with the
United States, he resided in this country for a significant period of
time and currently is detained here. In Verdugo-Urquidez, how-
ever, the Court made it clear that involuntary detention within the
United States would not, by itself, be a "sufficient connection" to
the United States.6 7 While the fact that Mr. X previously resided
in the United States lends some support to his quest for fourth
amendment protections,"" this particular defendant would not
have a sufficient connection to the United States. Mr. X has re-
sided within the United States but, even prior to his arrest, showed
no indication of wishing to return, nor does he maintain allegiance
to this country. Furthermore, he does not contribute to the na-
tional treasury by paying taxes, nor does he maintain a residence
or own any property within the United States. Therefore, in effect,
Mr. X has not "contracted" with the United States for the protec-
tions of the fourth amendment, although he will be entitled to re-
ceive other constitutional protections at trial.6 9
Hypothetical B: Clearly a "Sufficient Connection" for Fourth
Amendment Protections
Mr. Y, a former United States agent, is being prosecuted for
selling military secrets to a foreign government. Prior to his arrest,
Mr. Y renounced his American citizenship and defected to that
country. Shortly thereafter, he secretly returned to the United
States to recover $1 million in United States currency he had
from violating the Fourth Amendment, is applicable to acts of foreign officials." Id. (citing
Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967)); see
supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing joint ventures and step one of test).
"I See Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064. The Court acknowledged the argument of
Justice Stevens, who concurred in the opinion, that the fourth amendment should apply to
an alien who is lawfully in the country, although being held against his will. Id. However,
the Court held that this lawful but involuntary presence would not constitute the necessary
"substantial connection" to the United States. Id. To hold otherwise, the majority con-
cluded, would be to allow the application of the fourth amendment to turn upon the fortui-
tous circumstances surrounding the defendant. Id.
11 See id. at 1066. Presumably, the defendant's voluntary attachment to the United
States would be considered under the court's "sufficient connection" test. See id.
69 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing other constitutional pro-
tections granted more freely than fourth amendment protections).
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stored in a safe deposit box. During his clandestine return to the
United States, Mr. Y was arrested and detained in Virginia. Subse-
quently, United States officials searched his foreign residence with-
out a warrant and seized copies of the classified documents he pur-
portedly had sold. Mr. Y, whose estranged family still resides in
the United States, has substantial holdings in the United States,
including two homes and a substantial amount of property upon
which he had paid the required taxes up until his departure from
the United States. Mr. Y claims he is innocent and seeks the pro-
tections of the fourth amendment.
Analysis:
Step 1: Here, the warrantless search was conducted solely by
United States officials and, therefore, there is no need to examine
the "joint venture" standard articulated in Stonehill7 0
Step 2: Because Mr. Y has been accused of selling military
secrets to a foreign government, his actions would constitute trea-
son.71 Clearly, the court would find this violation to be a serious
offense7'2 and therefore should proceed to step three.
Step 3: Mr. Y satisfies the criteria of the third prong of the
proposed test. He owns two residences and other property in the
United States. Furthermore, the defendant has paid his taxes in
accordance with the laws of the United States. The only real issue
arises in reference to Mr. Y's absence from this country and his
intent to return. Although it appears that Mr. Y does not intend to
return to the United States on a permanent basis, he has resided
here all his life and has never been absent from the country for a
substantial period of time. As a result, Mr. Y should satisfy this
third step of the test; he therefore should receive fourth amend-
ment protections.
70 See supra notes 52-55 (discussing joint venture standard).
71 See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 29 (1945). The crime of treason consists of
two elements, both of which must be present in order to sustain a conviction: (1) adherence
to the enemy, and (2) rendering the enemy aid and comfort. Id.
72 See Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 342, 347 (1870). "No crime is greater than
treason. He who, being bound by his allegiance to a government, sells goods to the agent of
an armed combination to overthrow that government, knowing that the purchaser buys
them for that treasonable purpose, is himself guilty of treason or a misprision thereof." Id.
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Hypothetical C: A Possible "Sufficient Connection" for Fourth
Amendment Protections
Mr. Z, a resident of a Middle Eastern nation, is being tried for
a terrorist attack on a United States airliner which resulted in the
deaths of over two hundred United States citizens. The defendant
was apprehended by officials in his own country and properly ex-
tradited to the United States to stand trial. While he was in the
country, United States agents, cooperating with the police from
the defendant's home country, conducted a search of Mr. Z's for-
eign residence. The warrantless search uncovered a schedule of ter-
rorist bombings, including the one for which the defendant cur-
rently is being tried.
Mr. Z maintains several residences, none of which is located
within the United States. He did, however, attend college and
graduate school in California where he obtained a degree in chem-
istry and achieved notoriety as an explosives expert. The defend-
ant subsequently founded a company in Oklahoma which produced
explosives. Mr. Z's company employs over three hundred United
States citizens and supplies explosives to many United States cor-
porations, as well as the United States government. He visits the
United States regularly to check on business matters, but never
has manifested any intent to reside here permanently.
Analysis:
Step 1: This search was conducted by United States officials
in connection with a foreign government, therefore requiring appli-
cation of the Stonehill standard. The court must ask whether
"Federal agents so substantially participated in the raids so as to
convert them into joint ventures between the United States and
the foreign officials. 173 Because the present circumstances are simi-
lar to those in the Verdugo-Urquidez case, it appears that the
Stonehill standard would be satisfied. 4
Step 2: The murder of more than two hundred United States
citizens clearly is a serious offense. Therefore, this step of the test
would be satisfied and the court would then proceed to the third
step.
11 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (reciting Stonehill joint venture standard).
14 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1059 (1990). In Verdugo-Urquidez, DEA agents
asked for and received the cooperation of the Mexican officials. Id. The Court recognized
this as a "concert" of action. Id.
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Step 3: Although Mr. Z does not own or maintain a residence
in the United States, he does own and operate a business here.
This business generates a substantial amount of income within the
United States on which Mr. Z pays taxes. Furthermore, by employ-
ing a large number of United States citizens, Mr. Z's operations
patently are benefitting the United States. Although Mr. Z had re-
sided within the United States some time ago, any time lapse loses
importance due to his substantial business activity within the
United States. Although the court might find differently if the de-
fendant merely were a majority stockholder in a large United
States corporation, under these facts, Mr. Z's business involvement
in this country alone probably would satisfy this step of the test
and result in the granting of fourth amendment protections.
CONCLUSION
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the United States Supreme Court re-
fused to extend unconditionally the protections of the fourth
amendment and its exclusionary rule to nonresident aliens. This
decision is significant, in that it apparently reverses the trend to-
ward granting constitutional protections to noncitizens and apply-
ing the Constitution beyond the territorial borders of the United
States. The overall impact of Verdugo-Urquidez will depend upon
the methodology employed by the courts in their application of the
"sufficient connection" standard. This Note has offered guidelines
that clearly define and establish a process for making this determi-
nation, concentrating primarily on the benefits the alien offers the
United States and the benefits he derives from this country. Al-
though the Supreme Court ultimately must determine the parame-
ters of its "sufficient connection" test, the specific criteria sug-
gested in this Note provide a reasonable basis toward this end.
Michael J. Tricarico
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